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Abstract
Purpose – Natural disasters may inflict significant damage upon international financial markets. 
The purpose of this study is to investigate if any contagion effect occurred in the immediate  
aftermath of the Japanese earthquake, tsunami and subsequent nuclear crisis. 
Design/methodology/approach – Using 33 international stock indices and exchange rates, this 
paper  uses   heteroscedasticity  biases  based  on  correlation  coefficients  to  examine  if  any 
contagion  occurred  across  financial  markets  after  the  March  11,  2011  Japanese  earthquake, 
tsunami and nuclear crisis. The sample period is partitioned into two sections: the 12-month pre-
earthquake period (March 11, 2010 to March 10, 2011) and the 2-month post-earthquake period 
(March 11, 2011 to May 10, 2011). While the stability period is defined as the pre-earthquake 
period, the turbulent (turmoil) period is defined as the post-earthquake period. In a bid to ensure 
robustness of our findings, the turmoil period is further partitioned into two equal sections: the 1-
month (short-term) post-earthquake period (March 11, 2011 to April 10, 2011), and the 2-month 
(medium-term) post-earthquake (March 11, 2011 to May 10, 2011). 
Findings –  Findings  reveal  that,  while  no sampled  foreign  exchange markets  suffered from 
contagion,  stock  markets  of  Taiwan,  Bahrain,  Saudi  Arabia  and  South  Africa  witnessed  a 
contagion effect.
Practical  implications –  Our  results  have  two  paramount  implications.  Firstly,  we  have 
confirmed existing consensus that in the face of natural crises that could take an international 
scale,  emerging markets  are contagiously affected for the most  part.  Secondly,  the empirical 
evidence also suggest that international  financial  market  transmissions not only occur during 
financial crisis; natural disaster effects should not be undermined.
Originality/value  – This paper has shown that the correlation structure of international financial 
markets are also affected by high profile natural disasters. 
JEL Classification: G10; G15; F30
Keywords: Japanese Earthquake; Contagion; International Financial Markets
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1. Motivation
Natural disasters have inflicted serious damage on human life, property and economy. 
Though many earthquakes occur worldwide on an annual basis and impact all walks of life in 
one  way or  the  other,  collateral  effects  resulting  from such natural  disasters  could  be  quite 
detrimental financially and economically. The recent Japanese earthquake  resulted in collateral 
damage that makes the disaster particularly significant.  On March 11, 2011, a 9.0 magnitude 
undersea mega thrust earthquake hit Tohoku in Japan. This powerful shock triggered a tsunami 
that  struck  coastlines  across  the  east  of  the  country,  leaving  thousands  dead  and damaging 
considerable property.  But what appears to have left analysts startled and concerned over the 
consequences of this earthquake is the nuclear disaster resulting there-from. Recently classified 
as a level-seven event on the International Nuclear Event Scale, the Fukushima nuclear incident 
now poses a risk equal to the worst nuclear power plant accident in history (Chernobyl disaster). 
With much uncertainty over how the crisis would be managed, it is imperative to investigate how 
international financial markets have so far reacted. 
Therefore the goal of this paper is to examine whether any contagion effect has occurred 
two months after the Japanese earthquake, tsunami and worst nuclear crisis since Chernobyl. In 
other  words,  we  seek  to  provide  evidence  as  to  whether  such  a  disaster  has  increased  the 
interdependence among financial  assets  in different  countries.  The remainder  of the paper is 
organized as follows. Sections 2 examines related literature. Data and methodology are presented 
and outlined respectively in Section 3. Empirical analysis is covered in Section 4. We discuss 
results in Section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
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2. Related literature
2.1 Effects of financial market integration
Financial  integration  is  widely believed  to  improve  capital  allocation   efficiency and 
diversify risks (Demyanyk and Volosovych, 2008; Coulibaly, 2009; Kose et al., 2011). However, 
the recent global financial crisis deemed as the worst since the Great Depression has left many 
analysts concerned about the contagion effects of globalization. A great body of literature has 
been dedicated to the potential benefits of financial integration. 
With  respect  to  Kose  et  al.  (2011),  financial  globalization  in  theory should  facilitate 
efficient allocation of capital and improve international risk sharing. They further profess that 
benefits are much greater for developing countries because they are relatively scarce in capital 
and rich in labor availability. According to them, access to foreign capital should enable them 
grow faster via new sources of investment. On a positive note of financial globalization, Kose et 
al.  stress  that  since  developing  countries  have  more  volatile  output  growth  than  advanced 
industrial  economies,  their  potential  welfare  gains  from international  risk  sharing  are  much 
greater.  It is important to note an important finding of theirs: with certain identifiable thresholds 
in  variables  such as  financial  depth  and institutional  quality,  the  cost-benefit  trade-off  from 
financial openness improves significantly once the threshold conditions are met. Much earlier, 
Demyanyk and Volosovych (2008) analyzed the benefits of financial integration resulting from 
international  risk  sharing  among  25  European  Union  (EU)  countries.  In  their  case  for 
diversification of risk across EU member states, they posit that if risks are fully shared, the 10 
new members joining the EU should have higher gains than the long standing 15 members. It 
may be interesting to note South Africa as one of the most striking examples of the  cost and 
benefits  of  financial  integration.  As a  country  that  experienced  financial  autarky due  to  the 
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embargo imposed in 1985 and removed in 1993, Coulibaly (2009) found a significant decrease in 
the  rates  of  investment,  capital  and  output  during  the  embargo  period  as  compared  to  pre-
embargo and post-embargo periods. By the same token South Africa might have been immune to 
contagion from a global financial meltdown during the embargo period. 
It  follows that  countries in relative financial  autarky are less exposed to international 
shocks. While the prime advantage of financial integration is risk diversification, paradoxically 
increased  financial  globalization  can  reduce  the  scope  for  risk  diversification  as  integrated 
markets tend to be more correlated and highly interdependent. On another negative note, Kose et 
al. (2011)  stress that  a country may stand to reap the benefits of financial integration if certain 
threshold factors like financial depth and institutional quality are met. This stance is shared by 
Schmukler  (2004)  who  has  underlined  the  importance  of  sound  financial  fundamentals  and 
strong macroeconomic institutions; the absence of which will decrease the effectiveness of crises 
management and increase the probability of crises and contagion. 
2.2 Linkages among natural disasters, globalization and crises
In  the  first  part  of  this  literature  review,  we  present  several  benefits  of  financial 
integration as well as potential costs. As such , occurrences or crises in one country often due to 
domestic factors (human or natural) could be propagated to other countries through channels of 
globalization(trade or financial links for instance). There are four main routes via which natural 
disasters like the Japanese turmoil could lead to crises at a global level.
 On a first count, as stressed by Schmukler (2004), when a country’s financial system is 
more free, it  becomes an object of market discipline exercised by both foreign and domestic 
investors. As such reactions to unsound fundamentals resulting from natural disasters are not 
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only the concern of domestic investors as in closed economies. If the prospects for resolving the 
disaster are unclear, asymmetric information may lead investors to make irrational decisions that 
could result in a crisis depending on the degree of financial integration.
 On a second note, international financial market imperfections could arise from a natural 
disaster,  especially  herding  behavior,  speculative  attacks,  irrational  responses...etc.  Thus, 
regardless of market fundamentals, investors could speculate against a currency in the wake of a 
natural calamity if they deem the exchange rate unsustainable, which could lead to self-fulfilling 
balance-of-payments. This thesis presented by Obstfeld (1986) has been supported by Schmukler 
(2004) and more recently Asongu (2011a,b). 
Thirdly, even in the presence of sound fundamentals and absence of imperfections in the 
international capital market (after a natural disaster), crises might develop due to external factors 
(Schmukler, 2004) such as determinants of capital flows (Calvo et al., 1996) and foreign interest 
rates (Frankel and Rose, 1996). For example, if the country is foreign capital dependent, shifts in 
foreign capital after a natural calamity could create  additional financial issues and economic 
downturns.  As pointed out by Frankel  and Rose (1996),  foreign interest  rates could play an 
important role in determining the likelihood of financial crises in developing countries.
Last but not the least, according to Schmukler (2004) natural disasters could lead to crisis 
by contagion,  notably through shocks by real  links,  financial  links  and herding behavior  or 
unexplained high correlations.  Our focus on this Japanese earthquake will  rotate  around this 
fourth example; the definition and elucidation of which are worthwhile.  
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2.3 Definitions and channels of contagion
2.3.1 Definitions of contagion
There  is  yet  no  established  consensus  on  the  definition  of  contagion  by economists. 
However according to the World Bank there are three main definitions of contagion. First, from 
a broad prism the phenomenon could be seen with the general process of shock transmission 
across countries. This definition takes account of both negative and positive spillovers. Secondly, 
contagion could be synonymous with the propagation of shocks between two countries in excess 
of  what  should  be  expected  with  respect  to  existing  fundamentals  after  considering  co-
movements triggered by common shocks. This second definition is somehow restrictive as it 
presupposes  the mastery  of  what  constitutes  the  underlying  fundamentals,  without  which  an 
assessment  of  excess  co-movements  is  impossible.  The  third  and more  restrictive  definition 
considers the phenomenon as the change in transmission mechanisms that occur during the crisis 
period and  is assessed by a significant increase in cross-market correlations. 
With respect to this study, we shall limit ourselves to the third definition of contagion 
because: (1) our study aims to investigate only a crisis-period in the Japanese financial market 
(as opposed to the first definition); and (2) we have no mastery of what constitutes underlying 
fundamentals of co-movements we are about to investigate. 
From an empirical standpoint, Forbes and Rigobon (2002) first proposed a methodology 
for the third definition. They view contagion as a significant increase in market co-movements 
after a shock has occurred in one country. Owing to this conception, the condition for contagion 
is a significant increase in co-movements as a result of a shock in one market (considered the 
base criterion). It follows that if two markets display a high degree of co-movement during the 
stability  period,  even  if  they  are  highly  correlated  during  a  crisis,  but  if  the  difference  in 
7
correlation  is  insignificant,  contagion has  not  occurred.  Thus in the absence  of  a  significant 
increase  in  correlation  during  the  crisis  period,  the  term  ‘interdependence’  is  employed  to 
appraise the situation between the two markets.  
2.3.2 Channels of contagion
In  accordance  with  Schmukler  (2004),  three  main  channels  of  contagion  have  been 
identified  in the literature.  (1) Through real  links which are often tied to  trade links.  As an 
example,  if  we consider  two countries  trading together  and competing  in  the  same external 
market,  a  devaluation  of  the  exchange  rate  of  one  country  diminishes  the  other  country’s 
competitive advantage. In an attempt to rebalance its external sectors, the losing country would 
seek to depreciate/devaluate its own currency. (2) Via financial channels especially when two 
economies are connected through the international financial system. If we consider a leveraged 
institution facing margin calls as an example, and if the value of the collateral falls due to a 
negative shock in a given country, the institution would be poised to sell some of its holdings in 
countries not yet affected by the shock in an attempt to mitigate its initial stock. This response 
may give  rise  to  ripples  of  shocks that  could engender  contagion.  (3)  Lastly,  as  a  result  of 
herding  behavior  or  panic  resulting  from asymmetric  information,  a  financial  market  might 
transmit shocks across other markets. 
2.4 Measuring  contagion 
Quite a number of methods have been suggested in the literature for measuring the spread 
of international shocks across countries. Among these,  the  most  widely applied  are  cross-
market correlation coefficient measures (Lee et al., 2007; Collins and Biekpe, 2003; Forbes and 
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Rigobon, 2002; King and Wadhwani, 1990), volatility analysis based on ARCH and GARCH 
models  (King et  al.,  1994),  cross-market  co-integration  vectors  changing techniques  (Kanas, 
1998)  and  direct  estimation  of  specific  transmission  mechanisms(Forbes,  2000).  Within  the 
framework of this study, we shall adopt Forbes and Rigobon (2002) in the context of Lee et al.  
(2007). 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data
As we have earlier emphasized, we aim to investigate the correlations among returns of 
the  Japanese  daily  stock  index  (exchange  rate)  and  33  other  international  stock  indexes 
(exchange rates) returns. Adopting the Japanese equity and foreign exchange markets as the base 
criterion, we investigate if co-movements among national stock and foreign exchange markets 
increased significantly after  the major  earthquake,  tsunami  and nuclear  disaster.  The sample 
period is partitioned into two sections: the 12-month pre-earthquake period (March 11, 2010 to 
March 10, 2011) and the 2-month post-earthquake period (March 11, 2011 to May 10, 2011)1. 
While the stability period is defined as the pre-earthquake period, the turbulent (turmoil) period 
is defined as the post-earthquake period. In a bid to ensure robustness of our findings, the turmoil 
period is further partitioned into two equal sections: the 1-month (short-term) post-earthquake 
period (March 11, 2011 to April 10, 2011), and the 2-month (medium-term) post-earthquake 
(March 11, 2011 to May 10, 2011). The number of days are respectively 365, 31, 62 days for the 
stable, short-term turmoil and medium-term turmoil periods.  Data used in the study is obtained 
from Bloomberg’s database. In the computation of stock returns, last values are carried over for 
1 Differences in pre-earthquake and post-earthquake sample periods are in line with Collins and Biekpe (2003); Lee  
et al.(2007) and Asongu(2011ab). 
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non-trading days. The US dollar is used as the common “x” unit of foreign currency for each unit 
of  national/regional  currency in  the  computation  of  exchange  rate  returns.  Our  use  of  local 
currency index return is in line with Forbes and Rigobon (2002) who have shown that using 
dollar or local indices will produce similar results.
3.2 Methodology 
Borrowing from Forbes and Rigobon (2002), contagion is a significant increase in market 
co-movements after a shock has occurred in one country. 
The coefficient of correlation is defined as: 
yx
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σ
ρ =                                                                                                   (1)
Where:  ‘x’  represents  the  base  criterion  and  ‘y’  an  international  market.   This  correlation 
coefficient is adjusted in the following manner to take account of heteroscedasticity: 
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It measures the change in high-period volatility against volatility in the low-period. While the 
crisis interval is used as the high volatility period, the tranquil or stable-period represents the low 
volatility  period.  Contagion  is  eventually  measured  as  the  significant  increase  of  adjusted 
correlation coefficients in time-varying turmoil periods against the stability period.  
Borrowing from Lee et al (2007), the following hypotheses are tested: 
0: ≤− stoH ρρ  versus 0:1 >− stH ρρ
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Where,  ρt is the adjusted correlation coefficient during the turmoil period and  ρs the adjusted 
correlation  coefficient  for  the  stable  period.  A  comparison  of  the  difference  in  correlation 
between  the  stable  and  crisis  periods  is  then  carried-out.  The  null  hypothesis  (H0)  is  the 
hypothesis of no contagion while H1 is the alternative hypothesis for the presence of contagion. 
Fisher’s Z transformations of correlation coefficients are used to test pair-wise cross-country 
significance.   This  Fisher’s  Z-transformations  change  standard  coefficients  to  normally 
distributed Z variables. Therefore, before hypothesis testing,  ρ values must be converted to Zr 
values. 
0: ≤− stoH ρρ   ⇒ 0: ≤− rsrto ZZH  
0:1 >− stH ρρ   ⇒ 0:1 >− rsrt ZZH
Where:
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4. Empirical Results
4.1 Contagion effect in international stock indexes returns after earthquake 
Table 1 shows the conditional (unadjusted) correlation coefficients of international stock 
indexes for the 2011 Japanese Tsunami.  Cross-market correlations of stock index returns are 
compared before and after the earthquake of March 11, 2011. With the exceptions of China, 
Taiwan, New Zealand, Argentina, Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and South Africa; cross-market 
correlations between Japan and most countries in the sample during stable period are higher than 
those  during  medium-term  turmoil  period.  For  the  short-run  interval,  correlations  are 
strengthened for China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, Argentina, 
Germany, Bahrain, South Africa and Saudi Arabia. There is significant evidence of contagion in 
Taiwan, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and South Africa for the short-term turmoil period and only in 
Bahrain and Saudi Arabia for the medium-term turmoil interval. Comparatively,  for the most 
part volatilities of most countries during the stable period are higher than those during turmoil 
periods (short and medium terms). 
Unconditional  correlation  coefficients  are  presented  in  Table  2.  These  adjusted 
correlations  are  higher  that  their  unadjusted counterparts  in  table  1.   Results  of Table 1 are 
substantiated by those of Table 2.  
4.2 Contagion effect in international exchange rates returns after earthquake
Findings  in  Table  3  present  exchange  rate  conditional  (unadjusted)  correlation 
coefficients. Cross-market correlations during turmoil periods are higher than those during the 
stable period. Strengthened cross-market correlations with insignificant evidence of contagion 
are noticeable for Thai Baht (THB), Argentinian Peso (ARS), Egyptian Pound (EGP), and Qatari  
Riyal (QAR) for the short-term turmoil period. With regard to the medium-term, the Chinese 
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Yuan (RMB), Canadian Dollar (CAD), Egyptian pound (EGP), Qatari Riyal (QAR) and Emirati 
dirham (AED) also witnessed insignificant stronger co-movements with the Japanese Yen (JPY). 
Adjusted  results  from Table  4  confirm those  in  Table  3.  In  summary,  no  national/regional 
exchange market is found to have suffered from contagion two months in the aftermath of the 
Japanese earthquake and ensuing collateral disasters. 
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Table 1: International stock indices returns conditional (unadjusted) correlation coefficients in 2011 Japanese earthquake
Regions Countries
Full period Stable Period Short-term turmoil period Medium-term turmoil period
    ρ     σ     ρ     σ     ρ     σ Z-test Co     ρ     σ Z-test Co
South Asia
and South-
East Asia
India 0.288 0.009 0.343 0.009 0.247 0.009 -0.538 N 0.171 0.009 -1.321 N
Malaysia 0.372 0.005 0.405 0.005 0.392 0.005 -0.080 N 0.348 0.005 -0.474 N
Philippines 0.317 0.009 0.357 0.009 0.295 0.009 -0.353 N 0.266 0.008 -0.715 N
Singapore n.a 0.000 n.a 0.000 n.a 0.000 n.a n.a n.a 0.000 n.a n.a
Thailand 0.308 0.009 0.361 0.010 0.278 0.008 -0.470 N 0.209 0.008 -1.180 N
East Asia 
and North-
East Asia
China 0.283 0.011 0.309 0.012 0.477 0.007 1.022 N 0.321 0.007 0.100 N
Hong  Kong 0.510 0.009 0.542 0.009 0.574 0.009 0.240 N 0.525 0.008 -0.166 N
Taiwan 0.587 0.008 0.591 0.008 0.781 0.008 1.881* Y 0.694 0.008 1.247 N
South Korea 0.575 0.008 0.606 0.008 0.660 0.008 0.458 N 0.566 0.008 -0.437 N
Australasia Australia -0.004 0.008 0.000 0.008 0.073 0.007 0.373 N -0.021 0.007 -0.147 N
New Zealand 0.440 0.004 0.459 0.004 0.609 0.004 1.080 N 0.515 0.004 0.525 N
North 
America
Canada -0.055 0.197 -0.013 0.208 -0.441 0.125 -2.348 N -0.343 0.110 -2.455 N
U.S.A 0.176 0.012 0.217 0.013 0.054 0.008 -0.848 N 0.074 0.007 -1.041 N
Mexico 0.159 0.007 0.208 0.007 0.048 0.006 -0.831 N 0.027 0.006 -1.310 N
South 
America 
Argentina 0.174 0.012 0.163 0.013 0.312 0.011 0.807 N 0.269 0.010 0.795 N
Brazil 0.076 0.010 0.120 0.010 -0.033 0.006 -0.783 N -0.069 0.008 -1.351 N
Chile 0.117 0.007 0.178 0.007 -0.086 0.008 -1.357 N -0.035 0.007 -1.532 N
Europe
France 0.321 0.012 0.366 0.012 0.253 0.011 -0.639 N 0.254 0.010 -0.883 N
Poland 0.218 0.008 0.287 0.008 -0.045 0.006 -1.735 N 0.013 0.006 -2.014 N
Germany 0.325 0.009 0.366 0.009 0.350 0.012 0.083 N 0.334 0.011 -0.012 N
Italy 0.248 0.013 0.292 0.013 0.142 0.009 -0.806 N 0.169 0.009 -0.928 N
Holland 0.332 0.010 0.378 0.010 0.296 0.008 -0.473 N 0.271 0.008 -0.851 N
Spain 0.193 0.015 0.255 0.016 -0.116 0.009 -1.923 N -0.001 0.009 -1.860 N
U.K 0.292 0.009 0.361 0.009 0.135 0.008 -1.234 N 0.129 0.008 -1.764 N
Middle 
East and 
Africa
Bahrain 0.006 0.005 -0.050 0.005 0.290 0.006 1.774* Y 0.207 0.005 1.850* Y
Egypt 0.116 0.013 0.104 0.011 0.098 0.028 -0.027 N 0.131 0.022 0.198 N
Jordan -0.035 0.005 -0.020 0.005 -0.101 0.006 -0.413 N -0.097 0.005 -0.554 N
Kuwait -0.073 0.005 -0.026 0.005 -0.298 0.006 -1.431 N -0.256 0.004 -1.679 N
Qatar 0.019 0.009 0.046 0.009 -0.080 0.009 -0.641 N -0.064 0.008 -0.785 N
Saudi Arabia 0.182 0.011 0.117 0.011 0.493 0.013 2.154** Y 0.457 0.010 2.678*** Y
UAE 0.080 0.006 0.109 0.006 -0.055 0.006 -0.836 N 0.010 0.005 -0.706 N
South  Africa 0.348 0.009 0.343 0.009 0.634 0.008 1.994** Y 0.434 0.009 0.766 N
Other Russia 0.290 0.012 0.378 0.012 0.007 0.010 -1.992 N 0.069 0.012 -2.338 N
Note 1: *, **, ***: statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
Note 2: The table shows conditional (unadjusted) cross-market correlation coefficients (ρ) and standard deviations (σ) for Japan and other stock indexes. The test statistics are obtained from Fisher Z  
transformations. The stable period is defined as the 12-month pre-earthquake period (March 11, 2010 to March 10, 2011). The short-term turmoil period is defined as the 1-month post-earthquake period 
(March 11, 2011 to April 10, 2011). The medium-term turmoil period is defined as the 2-month post-earthquake period (March 11, 2011 to May 10, 2011). The full period is the stable period plus the  
medium-term turmoil period. Co: contagion .While “Y” denotes that the test statistics is greater than the critical value and contagion occurred, “N” indicates that the test statistics was less or equal to the  
critical value and no contagion occurred. 
Note 3: Correlation coefficients are unadjusted for heteroscedasticity. 
Table 2: International stock indices returns unconditional (adjusted) correlation coefficients in 2011 Japanese earthquake
Regions Countries
Full period Stable Period Short-term turmoil period Medium-term turmoil period
      ρ     σ     ρ*stp   ρ*mtp       ρ*     δ Z-test Co       ρ*     δ Z-test Co
South Asia
and South-
East Asia
India 0.288 0.009 0.430 0.445 0.315 -0.017 -0.679 N 0.229 0.032 -1.745 N
Malaysia 0.372 0.005 0.500 0.516 0.485 -0.077 -0.099 N 0.451 -0.111 -0.609 N
Philippines 0.317 0.009 0.445 0.460 0.373 0.007 -0.443 N 0.351 -0.143 -0.933 N
Singapore n.a 0.000 n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a
Thailand 0.308 0.009 0.450 0.465 0.352 -0.165 -0.591 N 0.279 -0.155 -1.549 N
East Asia 
and North-
East Asia
China 0.283 0.011 0.389 0.403 0.577 -0.433 1.262 N 0.418 -0.387 0.130 N
Hong  Kong 0.510 0.009 0.642 0.658 0.674 0.048 0.283 N 0.642 -0.106 -0.203 N
Taiwan 0.587 0.008 0.690 0.706 0.852 0.047     2.119** Y 0.794 -0.043 1.458 N
South Korea 0.575 0.008 0.704 0.719 0.753 0.016 0.528 N 0.682 0.092 -0.523 N
Australasia Australia -0.004 0.008 0.000 0.000 0.095 -0.706 0.485 N -0.028 -0.120 -0.199 N
New Zealand 0.440 0.004 0.558 0.574 0.707 -0.119 1.283 N 0.632 -0.172 0.651 N
North 
America
Canada -0.055 0.197 -0.017 -0.018 -0.539 -0.401 -2.985 N -0.445 -0.473 -3.277 N
U.S.A 0.176 0.012 0.278 0.289 0.070 -0.410 -1.096 N 0.100 -0.458 -1.401 N
Mexico 0.159 0.007 0.267 0.278 0.063 -0.174 -1.074 N 0.037 -0.118 -1.767 N
South 
America 
Argentina 0.174 0.012 0.210 0.219 0.393 -0.139 1.029 N 0.355 -0.198 1.059 N
Brazil 0.076 0.010 0.155 0.162 -0.043 -0.381 -1.018 N -0.094 -0.228 -1.833 N
Chile 0.117 0.007 0.229 0.238 -0.112 0.215 -1.761 N -0.048 0.038 -2.073 N
Europe
France 0.321 0.012 0.456 0.471 0.322 -0.124 -0.805 N 0.336 -0.188 -1.153 N
Poland 0.218 0.008 0.364 0.377 -0.058 -0.295 -2.240 N 0.017 -0.295 -2.702 N
Germany 0.325 0.009 0.421 0.436 0.437 0.255 0.104 N 0.434 0.142 -0.015 N
Italy 0.248 0.013 0.369 0.383 0.183 -0.314 -1.032 N 0.227 -0.306 -1.232 N
Holland 0.332 0.010 0.469 0.485 0.374 -0.209 -0.593 N 0.358 -0.242 -1.108 N
Spain 0.193 0.015 0.324 0.337 -0.151 -0.406 -2.489 N -0.001 -0.443 -2.504 N
U.K 0.292 0.009 0.450 0.465 0.175 -0.152 -1.571 N 0.175 -0.120 -2.333 N
Middle 
East and 
Africa
Bahrain 0.006 0.005 -0.065 -0.067 0.367 0.022     2.290** Y 0.276 -0.156    2.501** Y
Egypt 0.116 0.013 0.134 0.140 0.127 1.605 -0.036 N 0.177 0.991 0.268 N
Jordan -0.035 0.005 -0.026 -0.027 -0.131 0.077 -0.537 N -0.132 -0.159 -0.752 N
Kuwait -0.073 0.005 -0.034 -0.036 -0.376 0.088 -1.841 N -0.339 -0.157 -2.257 N
Qatar 0.019 0.009 0.059 0.062 -0.104 0.037 -0.834 N -0.087 -0.133 -1.066 N
Saudi Arabia 0.182 0.011 0.152 0.158 0.594 0.170    2.705*** Y 0.572 -0.111  3.502*** Y
UAE 0.080 0.006 0.141 0.147 -0.071 0.012 -1.087 N 0.014 -0.085 -0.957 N
South  Africa 0.348 0.009 0.429 0.444 0.730 -0.136     2.394** Y 0.548 -0.036 0.980 N
Other Russia 0.290 0.012 0.469 0.485 0.009 -0.176 -2.550 N 0.094 -0.006 -3.100 N
Note 1: *, **, ***: statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
Note 2: The table shows conditional (unadjusted) cross-market  correlation coefficients (ρ) , adjuster for heteroscedasticity (δ) and standard deviations (σ) for Japan and other stock indexes. The test 
statistics are obtained from Fisher Z transformations. The stable period is defined as the 12-month pre-earthquake period (March 11, 2010 to March 10, 2011). The short-term turmoil period is defined as  
the 1-month post-earthquake period (March 11, 2011 to April 10, 2011). The medium-term turmoil period is defined as the 2-month post-earthquake period (March 11, 2011 to May 10, 2011). The full  
period is the stable period plus the medium-term turmoil period. Co: contagion. While “Y” denotes that the test statistics is greater than the critical value and contagion occurred, “N” indicates that the  
test statistics was less or equal to the critical value and no contagion occurred. ρ*stp, ρ*mtp,  denote adjusted correlation coefficients for the short and medium term periods respectively. δ: correlation  
coefficient adjuster. 
Note 3: Correlation coefficients are adjusted for heteroscedasticity using Equation 2. 
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Table 3: International exchange rates returns conditional (unadjusted) correlation coefficients in 2011 Japanese earthquake
Regions Countries
Full period Stable Period Short-term turmoil period Medium-term turmoil period
       ρ      σ       ρ       σ          ρ      σ Z-test Co         ρ         σ     Z-test Co
South Asia
and South-
East Asia
India -0.136 0.004 -0.130 0.005 -0.282 0.002 -0.807 N -0.207 0.002 -0.560 N
Malaysia -0.197 0.004 -0.191 0.005 -0.332 0.002 -0.773 N -0.267 0.003 -0.570 N
Philippines -0.129 0.004 -0.128 0.005 -0.439 0.003 -1.746 N -0.143 0.003 -0.105 N
Singapore -0.029 0.003 -0.015 0.004 -0.197 0.003 -0.940 N -0.109 0.003 -0.674 N
Thailand 0.061 0.002 0.066 0.004 0.235 0.002 0.885 N 0.023 0.002 -0.307 N
East Asia 
and North-
East Asia
China 0.030 0.001 0.018 0.004 -0.090 0.001 -0.551 N 0.085 0.001 0.482 N
Hong  Kong -0.049 0.000 -0.020 0.004 -0.223 0.000 -1.049 N -0.225 0.000 -1.481 N
Taiwan -0.104 0.003 -0.080 0.004 -0.400 0.002 -1.748 N -0.251 0.002 -1.256 N
South Korea -0.242 0.007 -0.226 0.007 -0.500 0.005 -1.630 N -0.415 0.004 -1.508 N
Australasia Australia -0.080 0.007 -0.042 0.007 -0.428 0.006 -2.120 N -0.325 0.006 -2.099 N
New Zealand -0.031 0.007 0.035 0.007 -0.612 0.007 -3.812 N -0.419 0.006 -3.432 N
North 
America
Canada -0.272 0.006 -0.275 0.006 -0.390 0.004 -0.662 N -0.274 0.004 0.010 N
Mexico -0.338 0.005 -0.339 0.006 -0.521 0.003 -1.151 N -0.385 0.004 -0.378 N
South 
America 
Argentina -0.030 0.001 -0.026 0.001 -0.024 0.001 0.010 N -0.059 0.001 -0.237 N
Brazil -0.205 0.006 -0.181 0.006 -0.415 0.005 -1.316 N -0.356 0.006 -1.347 N
Chile 0.012 0.005 0.046 0.006 -0.281 0.004 -1.707 N -0.234 0.004 -2.028 N
Europe Euro 0.166 0.006 0.211 0.006 -0.204 0.004 -2.151 N -0.079 0.006 -2.094 N
U.K 0.043 0.005 0.073 0.005 -0.211 0.005 -1.467 N -0.147 0.004 -1.576 N
Middle 
East and 
Africa
Bahrain -0.021 0.006 -0.014 0.000 -0.029 0.000 -0.077 N -0.043 0.000 -0.208 N
Egypt 0.037 0.001 0.022 0.001 0.133 0.001 0.566 N 0.194 0.001 1.239 N
Jordan -0.026 0.001 -0.024 0.001 -0.131 0.000 -0.548 N -0.036 0.000 -0.088 N
Kuwait 0.247 0.001 0.258 0.001 0.182 0.001 -0.408 N 0.187 0.001 -0.533 N
Qatar 0.037 0.000 0.029 0.000 0.211 0.000 0.994 N 0.178 0.000 1.072 N
Saudi Arabia -0.027 0.000 0.005 0.000 -0.334 0.000 -1.795 N -0.194 0.000 -1.431 N
UAE -0.086 0.000 -0.094 0.001 -0.211 0.005 n.a n.a -0.037 0.000 0.406 N
South  Africa -0.130 0.007 -0.074 0.007 -0.601 0.007 -3.170 N -0.448 0.007 -2.906 N
Other Russia -0.140 0.004 -0.132 0.005 -0.377 0.003 -1.347 N -0.211 0.004 -0.580 N
Note 1: *, **, ***: statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. n.a: the presence of zero exchange rate return for all periods of the series. 
Note 2: The table shows conditional (unadjusted) cross-market correlation coefficients (ρ) and standard deviations (σ) for Japan and other stock indexes. The test statistics are obtained from Fisher Z  
transformations. The stable period is defined as the 12-month pre-earthquake period (March 11, 2010 to March 10, 2011). The short-term turmoil period is defined as the 1-month post-earthquake period 
(March 11, 2011 to April 10, 2011). The medium-term turmoil period is defined as the 2-month post-earthquake period (March 11, 2011 to May 10, 2011). The full period is the stable period plus the  
medium-term turmoil period. Co: contagion .While “Y” denotes that the test statistics is greater than the critical value and contagion occurred, “N” indicates that the test statistics was less or equal to the  
critical value and no contagion occurred. 
Note 3: Correlation coefficients are unadjusted for heteroscedasticity. 
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Table 4: International exchange rates returns unconditional (adjusted) correlation coefficients in 2011 Japanese earthquake
Regions Countries
Full period Stable Period Short-term turmoil period Medium-term turmoil period
    ρ      σ ρ*stp ρ*mtp        ρ*      δ Z-test Co       ρ*      δ Z-test Co
South Asia
and South-
East Asia
India -0.136 0.004 -0.181 -0.168 -0.379 -0.487 -1.104 N -0.265 -0.408 -0.721 N
Malaysia -0.197 0.004 -0.262 -0.245 -0.441 -0.510 -1.045 N -0.339 -0.356 -0.728 N
Philippines -0.129 0.004 -0.178 -0.166 -0.564 -0.267 -2.341 N -0.184 -0.281 -0.136 N
Singapore -0.029 0.003 -0.021 -0.020 -0.270 -0.154 -1.304 N -0.141 -0.088 -0.874 N
Thailand 0.061 0.002 0.092 0.086 0.320 -0.282 1.222 N 0.030 -0.194 -0.399 N
East Asia 
and North-
East Asia
China 0.030 0.001 0.024 0.023 -0.126 -0.142 -0.769 N 0.110 0.135 0.626 N
Hong  Kong -0.049 0.000 -0.029 -0.027 -0.304 0.072 -1.453 N -0.287 -0.099 -1.913 N
Taiwan -0.104 0.003 -0.112 -0.104 -0.520 -0.065 -2.367 N -0.320 -0.085 -1.617 N
South Korea -0.242 0.007 -0.308 -0.289 -0.628 -0.322 -2.138 N -0.510 -0.375 -1.892 N
Australasia Australia -0.080 0.007 -0.059 -0.055 -0.552 -0.096 -2.868 N -0.407 -0.142 -2.690 N
New Zealand -0.031 0.007 0.049 0.046 -0.734 -0.051 -5.032 N -0.515 -0.078 -4.378 N
North 
America
Canada -0.272 0.006 -0.371 -0.349 -0.509 -0.275 -0.878 N -0.347 -0.260 0.013 N
Mexico -0.338 0.005 -0.449 -0.424 -0.649 -0.407 -1.480 N -0.476 -0.350 -0.470 N
South 
America 
Argentina -0.030 0.001 -0.261 -0.033 -0.033 -0.261 0.013 N -0.077 -0.067 -0.308 N
Brazil -0.205 0.006 -0.246 -0.233 -0.537 -0.231 -1.761 N -0.444 -0.072 -1.708 N
Chile 0.012 0.005 0.064 -0.072 -0.378 -0.253 -2.359 N -0.444 -0.233 -2.622 N
Europe Euro 0.166 0.006 0.289 0.271 -0.280 -0.231 -2.983 N -0.103 -0.001 -2.712 N
U.K 0.043 0.005 0.102 0.095 -0.289 -0.074 -2.038 N -0.190 -0.150 -2.045 N
Middle 
East and 
Africa
Bahrain -0.021 0.006 -0.019 -0.018 -0.041 9.215 -0.107 N -0.056 6.189 -0.271 N
Egypt 0.037 0.001 0.031 0.029 0.184 -0.400 0.788 N 0.249 -0.496 1.603 N
Jordan -0.026 0.001 -0.034 -0.031 -0.181 -0.560 -0.763 N -0.047 -0.495 -0.114 N
Kuwait 0.247 0.001 0.349 0.328 0.250 -0.419 -0.557 N 0.240 -0.338 -0.681 N
Qatar 0.037 0.000 0.041 0.038 0.289 -0.500 1.308 N 0.229 -0.649 1.387 N
Saudi Arabia -0.027 0.000 0.006 0.006 -0.444 0.079 -2.464 N -0.249 0.025 -1.852 N
UAE -0.086 0.000 -0.131 -0.122 n.a -1.000 n.a n.a -0.048 -0.816 0.526 N
South  Africa -0.130 0.007 -0.103 -0.095 -0.725 0.003 -2.038 N -0.545 -0.041 -3.676 N
Other Russia -0.140 0.004 -0.183 -0.170 -0.494 -0.316 -1.821 N -0.270 -0.187 -0.746 N
Note 1: *, **, ***: statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
Note 2: The table shows conditional (unadjusted) cross-market  correlation coefficients (ρ), adjuster for heteroscedasticity (δ) and standard deviations (σ) for Japan and other stock indexes. The test 
statistics are obtained from Fisher Z transformations. The stable period is defined as the 12-month pre-earthquake period (March 11, 2010 to March 10, 2011). The short-term turmoil period is defined as  
the 1-month post-earthquake period (March 11, 2011 to April 10, 2011). The medium-term turmoil period is defined as the 2-month post-earthquake period (March 11, 2011 to May 10, 2011). The full  
period is the stable period plus the medium-term turmoil period. Co: contagion .While “Y” denotes that the test statistics is greater than the critical value and contagion occurred, “N” indicates that the  
test statistics was less or equal to the critical value and no contagion occurred. ρ*stp, ρ*mtp, denote  adjusted correlation coefficients for the short and medium term periods respectively. δ: correlation  
coefficient adjuster. 
Note 3: Correlation coefficients are adjusted for heteroscedasticity using Equation 2.
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5. Discussion of Results
This study has investigated if the March 2011 Japanese earthquake, tsunami and 
nuclear disaster affected the stability of the correlation structure in international stock and 
foreign exchange markets.
On  a  first  note,  with  respect  to  international  equity  markets  there  is  strong 
evidence of contagion in Taiwan, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and South Africa. The effect on 
Saudi Arabia is not unexpected because it is one of the four countries from which a large 
part  of  Japan’s  imports  in  raw  material  originate.  For  the  other  three,  cross-market 
correlations  strengthened  only  with  China  and  Australia  in  the  short-term,  albeit 
insignificant to account for contagion. An explanation as to why Saudi Arabia was most 
strongly affected  both  in  the  immediate  and medium terms  may be determined from 
Japan’s  boost  in  fuel  imports  in  substitution  to  energy  provided  by  wrecked  the 
Fukushima nuclear plants. Bahrain, being an oil-export driven economy like her sisterly 
neighbor Saudi Arabia, could not have suffered a different fate. As for Taiwan, Japan is 
its  second largest  trading partner  and official  estimates  on the effect  of  the Japanese 
earthquake on the Taiwanese economy stand at a yearly decline in growth by 0.2% of 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP). 
Secondly, international foreign exchange market results indicate no presence of 
contagion. Admittedly,  one would have expected the widespread disruption to Japan’s 
US$5.5 trillion economy to inevitably affect other countries in the Asia-Pacific region 
and beyond.  Regional  trade would have been immediately affected by the damage to 
Japanese ports.  Our unexpected  findings could be explained from the fact that  major 
Japanese  manufacturers  of  automobiles,  semiconductors,  computers  and  other  goods 
immediately took advantage of their international supply chains and production networks; 
therefore  moving  production elsewhere  in  Asia or  to  North  America,  where  capacity 
utilization is still low. Also, since Japanese factories generally produce consumer goods 
rather  than intermediate  products,  disruptions to  outbound shipments  should not have 
been expected to seriously affect production processes in other countries. 
As to what concerns managing and mitigating spillovers and contagion, it is worth 
pointing-out that globalization comes with costs and benefits. Hence managing financial 
market contagion resulting from natural disasters requires that governments minimize the 
costs and maximize the benefits of financial market integration. Most countries in the 
sample  have  undoubtedly  benefited  from  integration,  however  based  on  the  above 
empirical  evidence,  measures  need to  be  taken in  an  effort  to  manage  the  downside 
ramifications of integration in the event of a natural disaster. 
The following are some recommendations policy makers need to put in place in 
order  to minimize(mitigate)  the adverse financial  market  effects  of  disasters.  (1) The 
banking system of a country should not be directly exposed to foreign assets that natural 
disasters can easily stress and make worthless. This recommendation also holds for assets 
in institutions that natural disasters could render futile. This will mitigate the knock-on 
effects  through monetary,  financial and real channels. (2) Domestic financial markets 
(equity,  money,  foreign exchange and credit  markets)  may also suffer because of the 
‘substitution effect’. As credit lines and credit channels in the affected and contaminated 
countries run dry,  some of the credit-demand earlier  met by overseas financing could 
easily shift to the domestic sector and put pressure on domestic resources. The reversal of 
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capital flows arising from the de-leveraging process could put pressure on the foreign 
exchange  market,  leading  to  sharp  fluctuations  in  overnight  money  market  rates  and 
depreciation  of  currency.  It  is  therefore  in  the  interest  of  central  banks  to  adopt  a 
monetary  policy  stance  that  is  adequate  to  growth,  inflation  and  financial  stability 
concerns.  (3)In  situations  where  the  natural  disaster  reflects  an  expected  decline  in 
inflation, it is also in the interest of the central bank to adjust its monetary stance and 
manage liquidity: both domestic and foreign exchange to ensure that credit continues to 
flow for productive activities at both aggregate and sector specific levels. (4) In order to 
enable economic agents plan their  business activities with more assurance,  the central 
bank could ensure an orderly adjustment  of the pain of its  policies  by maintaining a 
comfortable liquidity position: seeing that the weighted average overnight money market 
rate is maintained within the repo-reverse repo corridor and ensure conditions conducive 
for flow of credit to productive sectors (particularly the stressed export industry sectors). 
Before we conclude, it is important to highlight the implications of this paper to 
the future of natural disasters. Though the crisis is over, from a financial standpoint the 
following concerns  will preoccupy policy makers in future natural disasters. (1) Is self-
insurance  a  viable  option  for  emerging  economies?  In  order  words,  could  the 
accumulation  of  foreign  reserves  buffer  against  financial  market  crises  arising  from 
natural disasters? Whether these reserves derive from current account surpluses(China for 
instance) or capital flows(India for example), relying on them to hedge contagion could 
still represent some form of liability. Hence the need to find a way of balancing the trade-
off between vulnerability to financial contagion and vulnerability to trade contagion in 
the event of a disaster.  Another important  strand within this  framework points to the 
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redundancy  of  self-insurance  if  international  arrangements(regional  and  multilateral) 
could  provide  easy,  quick  and unconditional  liquidity  during  such crises.  (2)How do 
policy makers keep the financial sector in line with the real sector in event of a natural  
disaster?  Forgotten  in  the  euphoria  of  financial  alchemy  is  the  basic  tenet  that  the 
financial sector has no standing of its own; it derives its strength and resilience from the 
real economic sector. Thinking the other way round has led many into believing that, 
significant value could be created by slicing and dicing securities. (3) How do we address 
regulatory arbitrage in times of crisis? If under the nose of regulators, grows an extensive 
and complex network of a ‘shadow banking system’ that encourages loose practices, hunt 
for quick yields and non-transparent and risky financial products, when  systems unravel 
owing to natural disasters, many of these institutions will pose a systematic risk to the 
financial systems. Hence the regulatory architecture has to be fashioned to keep pace with 
innovation  and  the  possibility  of  natural  shocks.  (4)Simulating  natural  disasters  and 
learning how to manage global imbalances arising from them could also help countries 
prepare for  potential financial and real sector consequences of natural crises. 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have used unadjusted and adjusted correlation coefficients to test 
for contagion effects across 33 economies in the aftermath of the Japanese earthquake, 
ensuing  tsunami  and  worst  nuclear  crisis  in  recent  history.  Results  indicate  no 
international  foreign  exchange  markets  experienced  significantly  stronger  correlations 
with  the  Japanese  Yen  two  months  after.  However,  for  international  stock  markets, 
Taiwan, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and South Africa experience contagion; consistent with 
the widely held notion that contagion is mostly a concern for emerging countries. 
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In line with Lee et al. (2007), the effects of natural disasters on financial markets 
are  important  in  investment  decisions,  as  the  benefits  of  portfolio  diversification  are 
severely limited during periods of high volatility and increased cross-market correlations. 
With  financial  globalization,  investors  can  gain  from  diversification  if  returns  from 
financial  markets  are  stable  and  not  correlated.  However  with  volatility  spillovers, 
increase in cross-market correlations exist as a real effect and are not taken into account 
for asset allocation and portfolio composition.  
Our  results  have  two paramount  implications.  Firstly,  we have  confirmed  the 
existing consensus that in the face of natural crises that could take an international scale, 
only emerging markets are contagiously affected for the most part. Secondly, we have 
also  shown  that  international  financial  market  transmissions  not  only  occur  during 
financial crises; natural disaster effects should not be undermined. 
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